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ABSTRACT
The growing popularity of Twitter and its ability to en-
able near instantaneous sharing of information has made
it a target of attacks by malicious entities who use it to
spam and provide links to malware. There is evidence that
these entities are using increasingly sophisticated techniques
that mimic the behavior of reputed sources to avoid detec-
tion. We use novel mechanisms that utilize the true social
network of users, the quality of information produced by
them and their tweeting behavior to identify such entities.
A scheme based on these mechanisms is even able to de-
tect malicious entities that collude to establish dense social
networks. Using actual data from a representative sample
of 278, 758 Twitter users, we demonstrate the e!ectiveness
of this approach by showing that (1) we identified 5334 ac-
counts that had links to unsafe websites, and (2) over a
period of 31 days, 181 accounts that our algorithm identi-
fied as potentially malicious were subsequently suspended
by Twitter. We believe our algorithm is one of the first to
automatically deal with a broad range of malicious entities
present in Twitter.
1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, there is a tremendous amount of information
that is available from online sources and new information
is constantly created and made available by these sources.
Search engines help find relevant information after it has
been created but the desire to have near instantaneous ac-
cess to information has led to micro-blogging services such
as Twitter [10]. Twitter allows users to post limited length
messages or tweets that alert users when new information,
that is of interest to them, becomes available. The popular-
ity of entities like CNN breaking news [2] for the latest news
headlines and Woot [14] for valuable shopping deals shows
Twitter’s e!ectiveness in enabling quick and easy access to
fresh information. Furthermore, since Twitter started out
as a social networking site, people use it to stay aware of the
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happenings in the lives of their friends, making it a one stop
source for information about personal and public events.
The growing popularity of Twitter, with 75 million users [3],
has made it an attractive target for malicious entities. Such
entities inject noise that is motivated by profit or for prop-
agating misinformation. Unlike the web, where information
sources have an implicit quality based on where they appear
in search engine results, in Twitter, there is no easy way of
assessing if a source is legitimate or malicious. The ease with
which a large number of tweets can be generated combined
with no existing mechanism to establish the legitimacy of
tweet sources has enabled malicious entities to exploit this
medium. For example, many of these malicious entities pro-
vide links to sites that contain malware or are spammers
who try to sell questionable products such as The Greatest
Vitamin in the World [5]. Clearly, it is important to sepa-
rate malicious entities from sources of useful information to
counter or mitigate the denial-of-information attacks that
result from noisy or misleading tweets.
Past research has explored how to characterize Twitter
users into information sources, friends and information seek-
ers [20]. In this paper, we focus on developing user char-
acterization that helps in distinguishing malicious entities
from legitimate users. This is challenging because many of
the observable characteristics of malicious entities are simi-
lar to good users. The Twitter webpage for a user provides,
among other things, the user’s name, a short bio, a geo-
graphical location, the friend and follower count and the
number of tweets. Friends are users that you follow while
followers follow you. The follower and friend count can be
inflated to any value through a variety of techniques [12].
In fact, many of the malicious entities that we observed had
over 5000 friends and followers. The information other than
follower and friend count is provided by the user and cannot
be validated. Since there is a large number of such malicious
entities and they can collude, there is an increased chance
that someone relying on Twitter to find a health supplement
ends up buying a potentially fraudulent product instead.
In this paper, we create a novel scheme that uses both
the true social network structure of users and their behav-
ioral characteristics to determine whether a certain user
is legitimate or malicious. The social network (SN) of a
Twitter user as advertised by the friend and follower count
does not indicate real relationships [19]. Instead, we use @-
messages, that direct conversation from one user to another,
and retweets, that are used to disseminate information, to
determine a user’s SN and call it his true social network
1
(TSN). We use PageRank [25] with the TSN to compute a
reputation value for each user which represents the user’s
ability to either engage other users or provide information
that is of interest to others. As malicious entities have low
quality information, a large number of them will end up with
low reputation values.
A serious problem with using only PageRank, even when
it is used with the TSN, is that along with malicious en-
tities, users with moderate to small sized friend circle who
use Twitter primarily as a social networking site will have
low reputation values. These users tweet occasionally and
most of their tweets are personal updates. Malicious enti-
ties, on the other hand, are trying to gain the attention of
users by tweeting frequently. They also include links in their
tweets and @-mention random users. The behavioral traits
of these two sets of users are significantly di!erent. There-
fore, we combine PageRank with behavioral traits to derive
a combined reputation value that provides a good indication
of whether a user is legitimate or malicious.
Intuitively the combined reputation value reflects the di-
chotomous nature of Twitter as both a social network and
an information dissemination site. Entities who use it for so-
cial networking have certain distinguishing behavioral traits
and entities who use it to provide information to a large set
of users can be judged by the quality of their true followers
(PageRank). Entities who aggressively try to disseminate
information and yet do not have high quality true follow-
ers do not provide useful information and are potentially
malicious.
Most of the aggressive, malicious entities can be caught
using the combined reputation value. However, some mali-
cious entities in Twitter use a variety of techniques to appear
legitimate which include inflating follower counts and inter-
spersing malicious tweets with famous quotations. Many of
these malicious entities are successful in having other legiti-
mate users follow them and exhibit less aggressive behavior.
We observed that despite the inflated follower counts, many
of them do not have an actual SN when they enter the sys-
tem. The increased follower counts are often a result of ran-
domly following other malicious entities and getting them to
reciprocate. Therefore, we can identify such sophisticated
malicious entities by determining if a large set of their ini-
tial friends are malicious entities of the more aggressive kind.
We correct their reputation value by decreasing it based on
the number of initial friends who are aggressively malicious
and the corrected reputation value is a true indication of
whether they are legitimate or malicious.
In this paper we make the following contributions:
• We combine true social network PageRank and
behavioral traits to create a robust mechanism
to identify malicious entities: Our algorithm uses
the dichotomous nature of Twitter to its advantage
by realizing that malicious entities have poor qual-
ity information and yet try to disseminate it aggres-
sively, thereby providing a robust identification mech-
anism for them. In addition, since the TSN is far
smaller than the advertised SN, we are able to calcu-
late the reputation value several orders of magnitude
faster than calculating PageRank with the advertised
SN. For 278, 758 Twitter users, TSN PageRank takes 5
minutes while the advertised network PageRank takes
10 hours, ! 120 times slower.
• Our algorithm identifies massively colluding ma-
licious entities using temporal pulldown: We are
able to identify malicious entities who massively col-
lude to appear legitimate by realizing that many of
their initial set of friends are malicious entities that
are more easily identified based on their behavior.
• We validate the e!ectiveness of our algorithm
in identifying malicious entities using real data:
We collected data for 278, 758 users which included 10
known malicious entities and their social network. Our
algorithm identified all the 10 malicious entities we in-
troduced. In addition, 181 of the accounts that we
identified as malicious were subsequently blocked by
Twitter over a period of 31 days from March 14th to
April 14th. We further identified 5334 accounts that
had links to unsafe websites. To the best of our knowl-
edge, our paper is the first attempt in automatically
and e"ciently identifying a broad class of malicious
entities in Twitter.
In Section 2, we describe how we collected a representa-
tive sample dataset and briefly highlight insights that were
gained from it. We then outline our scheme and present the
concrete algorithm that results from it in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 describes our evaluation approach and discusses the
key results. Related work is presented in Section 5 and the
paper is concluded in Section 6.





Science/Tech. NASA iPAD, Firefox API, startup
Sports Serena
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H1N1, viral fever, dining
Entertainment Ashton
Kutcher
Shutter Island, radio, actor
News/Politics The
Economist
Chile earthquake, Joe Biden,
healthcare
Education Danah Boyd university students, alumni, pro-
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Table 1: Categories for seed users and details be-
hind user selection. Many of the popular users had
over 1M followers, e.g., Serena Williams. The key-
words represent both common and recently popular
keywords used in that category, e.g., football and
winter olympics.
In order to collect a representative and diverse set of users,
we first picked 100 seed users from Google News categories as
shown in Table 1. The number of followers for any Twitter
account ranges from zero followers (e.g., newly created ac-
counts) to over four million followers (e.g., Ashton Kutcher)
and roughly follows a power law distribution. We use a
similar distribution for our seed users by creating 6 buckets
based on the number of followers: 0 - 250 (1), 250 - 2000 (2),
2000 - 20K (3), 20K - 100K (4), 100K - 1M (5), 1M+ (6).
We ensure that the seed users per category are represented
from low to high buckets in a similar power law distribu-






































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Out of the cluttered advertised social network of Ashton Kutcher (aplusk) emerges his true network.
The node size is based on the follower count, and the edge size is based on the number of @-mentions to that
particular user. The interaction between Ashton Kutcher and his wife Demi Moore (mrskutcher) is high.
bucket 1, two bucket 2, one bucket 3 and one bucket 4, 5 or 6
user. The nine users from the lower buckets 1, 2 and 3 were
chosen by identifying users who were tweeting about topics
related to that category. The keywords used per category
are shown in Table 1. For example, in sports we picked users
who tweeted about the winter olympics, football or basket-
ball. The one user from high follower bucket (4, 5 or 6) is a
very popular seed user from that category (over 20K follow-
ers) and is shown in Table 1. In sports, we picked Serena
Williams who had over 1M followers. We also ensured that
the tweets of each of the seed users were publicly available,
recently posted and had no noticeable malicious activity.
Figure 2: The seed user distribution across di!erent
categories.
For each seed user we sort the friends of the user (peo-
ple that he follows) based on who he @-mentions the most.
These are people the user frequently interacts with and this
helps identify the true social network (TSN) of a user as op-
posed to what is advertised by Twitter in the form of friends
and followers. For Ashton Kutcher, his advertised social net-
work and TSN is shown in Figure 1. Though Ashton has
an advertised friend list of over 300 friends, the users he in-
teracts with form a less cluttered graph. In addition, if we
look at the number of @-mentions, indicating frequency of
interaction, a more closely knit group emerges that includes
his wife, Demi Moore (mrskutcher), his production company
Katalyst Films (katalysthq) and his animated cartoon site
Blah Girls (krystle blah). The TSN, therefore, helps in cap-
turing the more meaningful relationships of a user.
To capture the TSN, we pick the 30 friends whom the
user has @-mentioned the most and then pick 20 of their
friends with the most @-mentions and similarly 10 friends
for each friend of a friend. If any user has @-mentioned less
than 30, 20 or 10 (based on where we are) of his friends, we
pick friends at random. In addition, we only pick friends
who have tweets that are publicly available. For each user,
this should give his true social network within 3 hops, giving
more importance to the closer social network. For each seed
user and his TSN, we collect details which include name,
screen name, friends list and follower list, and the last 200
tweets. In this fashion, we collected data for 252, 189 users
with the Twitter Representational State Transfer (REST)
API. The REST API allows 20000 requests per hour for
each whitelisted account and we requested 10 such accounts
from Twitter allowing us 200000 requests per hour. We
included rate limiting in our scripts to ensure we made at
most 150000 requests per hour. In addition, Twitter takes
longer to provide friends, followers and tweets of users, due
to which we collected this data over a period of two days
from March 5th to 6th, 2010.
2.1 Malicious Entity Data
In addition to the seed users, we similarly collected data
for 10 users who engage in various types of malicious activ-
ity as defined by the Twitter rules [8]. These predominantly
include spammers who post misleading tweets or provide
links to well known scams like Acai Berry supplements [1]
or a mom’s teeth whitening discovery [7]. We also included
users who provide links to websites that host malware or
indulge in phishing. For the 10 malicious accounts, we col-
lected their TSN on March 8th, 2010 and this added 26, 569
users to our existing dataset giving a total of 278, 758 unique
users.
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Within our complete dataset, in addition to the 10 mali-
cious seed accounts, we assume there exist many more mali-
cious accounts. To verify this, over a period of 31 days from
March 14th to April 14th, every night at 12 am, we ran a
script to see if Twitter had suspended any account from our
dataset. We found 2 of our 10 malicious seed accounts and
220 other accounts had been suspended for strange activ-
ity. These 222 accounts form our malicious account subset
against which we test the e!ectiveness of our approach.
2.2 Representativeness of Our Dataset
To show that our dataset is representative, we plot the
complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) of
the fraction of users who have friends and followers above a
certain number, and this is shown in Figure 3. This graph
is plotted for all 278, 758 users in our dataset. The follower
line fits a power law distribution with exponent ! = 2.306
for users with number of followers lesser that 105. This is
in accordance with analysis conducted on all of Twitter in
[23] where the CCDF of the number of followers fit a power
law with exponent ! = 2.276. The friend line is similar with
exponent ! = 2.116. We also observe that there is a glitch
in the friend line at 2000 which is the artificial friend limit
imposed in Twitter [4].
2.3 Approaches for Characterizing Malicious
Activity
Malicious entities succeed only if they gain the attention
of other users to their substandard products or are able to
direct them to their malware/phishing sites. Based on this,
we can try some simple mechanisms to distinguish between
legitimate and malicious accounts. However, we find that
none of these mechanisms are able to make this distinction
e!ectively. To demonstrate this, we show the results of two
such methods.
We first try to use tweet frequency of users (number of
tweets per day), as malicious entities who are trying to gain
the attention of other users will potentially tweet far more
aggressively. Figure 4 shows the tweet frequency, for (a)
all users, and (b) subset that contains users who were sus-
pended by Twitter. Since we parse only the last 200 tweets,
the tweet frequency is at most 200 (the actual frequency
can be higher). From Figure 4, we see that most users tweet
less than 5 times a day (over 75% of users). Contrast this
with only 35% of malicious accounts who tweet lesser than 5
times (Note: Figure 4 (a) is log and (b) is linear in the num-
ber of users). This shows that malicious entities are more
aggressive than regular users. However, there is no single
threshold which can distinguish (a) from (b), as there are
some legitimate users at each tweet frequency. Surprisingly,
there are a significant number of people who even tweet 200
times a day (1408 such accounts). These include 22 mali-
cious accounts shown in Figure 4(b). We manually looked
at some of the remaining 1387 accounts to see if they are
all malicious. We find that there are many legitimate users
who tweet 200 times a day with inspirational quotes or use
Twitter as a conversational tool to constantly interact with
their social network. Therefore, tweet frequency alone can-
not be used to distinguish between legitimate and malicious
accounts.
@-mentions are used to address a tweet to a particular
user [18]. Legitimate users typically @-mention their friends
who in turn interact with each other. Malicious entities
















Figure 3: CCDF of the fraction that has more than
a particular number of friends and followers in our
Twitter sample. The graph is similar to ones plotted
over the entire Twittersphere. We also notice the
drop in the graph at 2000 friends due to the artificial
friend constraint specified in the Twitter rules.
on the other hand try to gain attention by @ mentioning
random users. Therefore, a second approach in identifying
a malicious entity is seeing if a large fraction of people that it
@-mentions do not interact between themselves. This can
be measured by the clustering coe"cient (CC) of a user.
We consider our dataset to be a graph, where each vertex
is a user and there exists a directed edge between user i
and j if i @-mentions j. The CC of a user is defined as
No. of triangles
No. of wedges . This, essentially, measures for each pair of
users j and k that user i @-mentions (wedge), whether j
@-mentions k or k @-mentions j (forms a triangle). Out
of our sample of 278, 758 Twitter users, only 211, 209 users
have used @-mentions in their tweets. Similarly, only 91
of the 230 malicious accounts have used @-mentions. For
these users the CC is shown in Figure 5 where (a) is for all
users, and (b) is for the malicious account subset. There
are ! 17% of all users who have greater than .9 CC, while
only ! 11% of malicious entities have such a high CC. On
the other hand, both malicious entities and legitimate users
have ! 4% of users with zero CC, where none of the users
they @-mention ever interact. Though legitimate users have
a much higher CC than malicious entities, the CC values are
well spread across all values, implying malicious entities can
appear as well connected as legitimate users.
3. IDENTIFYING MALICIOUS ENTITIES
As in any other system, malicious entities in Twitter are
looking to draw attention of other users towards poor quality
information (e.g. phony products) or to malware/phishing
sites. They aggressively push this information to increase
their chance of reaching some user who will be convinced to
look at it. To convince the user, they also need to appear
legitimate. This reveals three characteristic traits of a mali-
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Figure 4: Tweet frequency of (a) complete user set,
and (b) malicious account subset. There is no single
cut-o! point to distinguish legitimate from malicious
accounts.
cious entity: they (1) possess substandard information, (2)
make up for lack of quality by quantity, and (3) try hard to
appear legitimate. The abundance of information in Twitter
allows many of these malicious accounts to continue operat-
ing without being detected (information overload). However
in this section, we show how we can exploit these traits to
identify these accounts.
3.1 Assessing Information Quality
Twitter works both as a social network and an information
dissemination site. Relationships between users are created
by the process of following. When a user A follows another
user B, A becomes B’s follower and B becomes A’s friend.
B in turn can follow A to make the relationship mutual.
However, this process is artificial as many users automat-
ically follow back users who follow them including verified
accounts like BarackObama. We call this the advertised so-
cial network of Twitter. Malicious entities take advantage of
this, by actively following users and un-following users that
do not reciprocate. Huberman et. al. [19] show that real
social network engagement exists, instead, in the form of
@-mentions, retweets and direct messages. Retweets (RT s)
are used to repeat a tweet, and are a way to spread or popu-
larize someone else’s tweets [15]. RT s use the same notation
as @-mentions, with the exception that the @ is preceded
with an RT. Directed messages are similar to @-mentions
but are private between the interacting users. Among the
publicly available Twitter data, @-mentions mostly facili-
tate social networking and RT s facilitate information dis-
semination. We call the network gleaned from @-mentions
and RT s as the true social network (TSN) of users.
PageRank has been used to judge the relative importance
of a webpage, where pages that have incoming links from
other highly ranked pages receive a high rank themselves
(through an iterative computation). We use PageRank built
on top of the TSN to rank users based on their ability to
either engage other users or provide meaningful information
and denote it by PRTSN . Specifically, we use a weighted




































Figure 5: Clustering coe"cient of (a) complete user
set, and (b) malicious entities. There is no single
cut-o! point to distinguish legitimate users from ma-
licious entities.
PageRank model where the link from user A to user B
is weighted based on the number of times user A has ei-
ther @-mentioned or RTed user B. Therefore users who are
@-mentioned or RTed by well ranked users, become well
ranked themselves. Formally, the transition matrix for the






Since malicious entities have low quality information, a
large number of them will end up with low PRTSN val-
ues. However, not all users with low PRTSN are necessarily
malicious. For example, users with moderate to small sized
social networks use Twitter to occasionally provide personal
updates to their immediate social network. These users will
not have well ranked users either @-mentioning or RT ing
them resulting in low PRTSN values. On the other hand,
malicious entities, in trying to get noticed, will produce large
quantities of information and yet will not have high PRTSN
values. Therefore, PRTSN in combination with behavioral
characteristics is a good indication of whether a user is ma-
licious.
3.2 What Constitutes Bad/Aggressive Behav-
ior ?
In Twitter, malicious entities try to gain attention in one
of the following ways: (1) tweeting frequently, (2) provid-
ing links to their products, and (3) @-mentioning random
users. When users search on Twitter, the results are ordered
based on time. So malicious entities tweet often to ensure
that their tweets are constantly seen. Many malicious en-
tities who are trying to link to phony products or malware
will tweet frequently. Twitter policy states that a user may
be considered in violation of its spam rules, “If your updates
consist mainly of links, and not personal updates”. However,
there are many legitimate entities that use Twitter primar-
ily as a information dissemination site and tweet frequently
with links in their tweets. For example, TweetMeme tweets
40 times a day on the most popular links on Twitter (digg






























Figure 6: Users of Twitter categorized into four ar-
eas. Top left (blackbirds) are legitimate users with
good behavior and low PRTSN , top right (robins)
are celebrities, bottom right (nightingales) are fre-
quent event updaters (news, memes) and the bot-
tom left(crows) are malicious entities who have low
PRTSN and also exhibit bad behavior.
this service informative and RT TweetMeme often, giving
it a high PRTSN value (rank 1).
We see that there is an interplay between PRTSN and
behavior, where users with low PRTSN (small SN) are not
necessarily bad as long as their behavior is good. Further-
more, users who appear to have poor behavior traits may
not necessarily be bad as long as they have a high PRTSN .
However, when users aggressively try to disseminate infor-
mation and yet do not have high PRTSN values, they have
low quality information and are potentially malicious. Intu-
itively, these two aspects represent the dichotomous nature
of Twitter as a social networking and an information dis-
semination site and can be visualized as shown in Figure
6.
In Figure 6 users are categorized into one of four ar-
eas. Users with high PRTSN and good behavior (top right,
robin) are the celebrities who have a significant number of
users interacting with them through @s or RT s. For exam-
ple, Conan O’Brien, a talk show host, tweets infrequently
(tweet frequency: 1.08/day), however each of his tweets are
RTed many times across a wide user base. In addition, a
large number of users @-mention him in their tweets result-
ing in a high PRTSN value (7th highest). We observe that
a malicious entity cannot replicate this success by getting a
large number of other malicious entities to RT its tweets as
PRTSN inherently provides more weight to RT s from users
who themselves have high PRTSN . On the other hand, en-
tities like TweetMeme which tweet 40 times a day, can af-
ford to behave aggressively as they are also popular across
a wide user base. Such entities occupy the bottom right
(nightingale) area in Figure 6 along with other news enti-
ties such as Pete Cashmore’s Mashable and CNN Breaking
News. Legitimate users with moderate to small sized social




























Figure 7: Combined algorithm used to identify mali-
cious entities. It uses PRTSN and behavioral charac-
teristics to create a combined rank which is used to
distinguish legitimate accounts from malicious ones
and occupy the top left (blackbird) area while the malicious
accounts occupy the bottom left (crow) and are character-
ized by a low PRTSN value and they exhibit bad behavior.
Therefore, our system looks at a combination of a user’s
PRTSN and behavioral characteristics to determine if he is
legitimate or malicious.
Finally, certain malicious entities @-mention random users
to get their attention. This is against Twitter’s policy which
states that a user can be considered a spammer, “If you send
large numbers of unsolicited @-replies in an attempt to spam
a service or link”. For example, if we make the assumption
that following a user is an indication of soliciting interaction,
then the metric 1 " No. of @-mentions to followersTotal no. of @-mentions shows what
fraction of a user’s @-mentions are unsolicited. Though fol-
lowing a user does not necessarily imply solicitation, this
definition allows easy calculation of the metric without re-
quiring extra data collection. We flag down a user that has
a high number of outside @-mentions as a malicious entity.
3.3 Collusion Among Malicious Entities
Most malicious accounts can be identified using a combi-
nation of PRTSN and behavioral characteristics. However,
we notice certain malicious entities have amassed a large so-
cial network (over 5000 friends and followers), and are not
as aggressive in posting links or tweeting frequently. These
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entities have managed to attract some legitimate users to be
part of their social network and behave less aggressively to
ensure these users do not un-follow them. A user can easily
be fooled into believing the legitimacy of such an account.
However, we notice that many of the initial friends of such
entities are actually aggressively malicious. Therefore, we
can identify the more sophisticated malicious entities based
on the company they start out with. The only reason they
have an inflated social network is due to the more aggressive
malicious accounts. On the other hand, legitimate users will
rarely follow these aggressive malicious accounts. For every
user, we can determine how many users in their initial so-
cial network are aggressively malicious and if this number is
significantly high, identify the user as potentially malicious.
3.4 Combined Algorithm
We combine our techniques into the final algorithm shown
in Figure 7. To compute PRTSN , we first create the PageR-
ank transition matrix which is a square matrix of order N ,
where N is the number of users. We increase the count at
location (i, j) in the matrix whenever user i @-mentions or
RT s user j in a tweet. After we parse all the tweets for all
users, we normalize the matrix and calculate the left prin-
ciple eigenvector (PageRank) of this matrix. This vector
consists of reputation values, one for each user. This value
is an indication of how influential a user and his tweets are.
We remove users who have a high PRTSN (top 5%) and
categorize them as influentials [23, 26] and do not consider
them in the rest of the algorithm.
Before calculating behavioral metrics, we first remove all
users who have tweeted less than a certain number of tweets,
tm (tm = 10 in our system) during their entire lifetime.
These accounts are most often inactive or occasionally be-
long to a new user. For such accounts, none of the met-
rics we calculate are meaningful. We assume that if we
need to identify a malicious account in this set, we can
use other techniques like content filtering as there are a
low number of tweets to be parsed. For the remaining
users, we first calculate the number of tweets that have links.
We use this to calculate the link ratio, LR = No. of linksNo. of tweets .
We also calculate the tweet frequency of the user using
TF = No. of tweetsTime between last and first tweet . LR is between 0 and
1 and since we consider the last 200 tweets for a user, TF
is between 0 and 200.
We calculate a combined rank based on the user’s PRTSN




The denominator, LRi # TFi is essentially the number of
tweets per day that have links. This value indicates how
aggressively user i is trying to disseminate his information.
PRTSNi indicates how interested other users are in prop-
agating i’s information. Users who tweet infrequently and
have few links and yet get their information disseminated are
users who provide naturally interesting information within
the 140 character tweet. These include celebrities like Conan
O’Brien whose day to day updates are interesting to a large
demographic of users. These users have the highest CR val-
ues. For entities like news or meme sites, CR values are a
tradeo! between their aggressiveness and how useful other
users find their links (and therefore RT them). For legiti-
mate users who only provide social updates and do not have
a widespread reach, their low PRTSN values are o!set (ex-
plained) by their good behavior. The users with the lowest
CR values are those who try to propagate information ag-
gressively but their information is deemed worthless by most
users. Malicious entities in Twitter fall in this category and
we classify users below a certain CR value threshold, CRls,
as malicious.
The next step of the algorithm is using the malicious en-
tities identified above to determine if there exist collusions
which contain a significant number of them and some less
aggressive malicious entity. We only consider users below
a certain CR value threshold, CRhs, resulting in a band of
users between CRhs and CRls whose CR value we correct
for collusions. We calculate the corrected combined rank for






CRi N = 0
where N is the number of initial friends who we identify as
malicious based on CR. Essentially, when a user has mali-
cious friends, we correct his combined rank with the number
of malicious friends he has made initially.
$i|CRls % CRi % CRhs : CRi = min(CRi, CR"i)
After the pulldown all the users who have a rank below CRls
are categorized as malicious and this forms the first spam
list as shown in Figure 7. The first spam list contains users
who have CRi < CR
ls.
Finally, we consider the users who @-mention a large num-
ber of users outside their social network. Since @-mentions
are primarily used for interaction within a user’s social net-
work, such behavior is in itself anomalous and it does not
matter what their PRTSN values are. Users who satisfy the
following inequality are categorized as malicious:
No. of @ mentions to followers
Total no. of @ mentions
% !#Total no. of @ mentions
Max no. of @ mentions
Since we only consider 200 tweets, we set the Max no. of
@ mentions to this value. The equation ensures that users
with lesser @-mentions require a greater percentage of them
to be unsolicited to be caught. For example, for ! = .9, a
user with 100 @-mention needs more than 55 of them to be
outside his social circle (to non-followers), while a user who
has only 20 @-mentions will need 18 of them to be outside to
be considered malicious. As shown in Figure 7, this outputs
the second list of malicious accounts and along with the first
list constitutes all the users who are categorized as malicious.
The rest of the users are categorized as legitimate users. In
the next section we detail how we evaluate this algorithm.
4. EVALUATION
4.1 True Social Network PageRank
To compute PRTSN , we first represent the transition ma-
trix as a sorted coordinate edge list file with each line of
the file of the form (row, column, value), where value is
the number of times the first user (row) @-mentions or
RT s the second user (column). This file contains 3206295
edges for the 230, 959 users in our system. The remain-
ing 47799(278, 758 " 230, 959) users have never been @-
mentioned or RTed and have never used @-mentions or RT s
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Figure 8: Users behavior against PRTSN . The sus-
pended accounts caught by the CR mechanism are
shown in the bottom left and far left. Above and to
the right are the accounts caught due to pulldown
and @-mention mechanisms.
themselves and are not considered in the PRTSN calcula-
tion. Instead, we assign a PageRank value lower than the
minimum PRTSN value computed. We use Network Work-
bench (NWB) [6] which uses the iterative power method
to compute the left principal eigenvector of our transition
matrix (PRTSN ).
As the TSN matrix used is sparse, with 3 million entries
(# = 3206295
(230959)2
= 6# 10#5), the running time is only 5 mins
on a 8 core, 2-GHz Quad-Core AMD Opteron processor with
16 GB of memory, and running 2.6.24 Linux Kernel (Ubuntu
8.04.2). Contrast this with the advertised SN matrix which
has 130 million entries, a 100 fold increase (# = 130459258
(278742)2
=
1.6 # 10#3), and a running time of 10 hrs, a 120 fold time
increase. Therefore, using PRTSN allows a faster ranking of
users and this can catch malicious entities more e"ciently.
After calculating PRTSN we identify the top 5% of users
as influentials and do not consider them in the rest of the
algorithm.
4.2 Combined Rank
The e!ectiveness of the combined rank can be visualized
in Figure 8 where the X-axis is PRTSN and the Y-axis is
1
LR$TF (good behavior). The Figure is similar to the crow
blackbird user categorization shown in Figure 6. Users on
the far left were users who are not @-mentioned or RTed by
any user in our system and have themselves never used an
@-mention or RT. Out of the accounts suspended by Twit-
ter, the red crosses indicate accounts that we identified as
malicious using the combined rank mechanism and we can
see them occupying the triangular area at the bottom left
and the far bottom left. We identified the most number
of malicious accounts suspended by Twitter using the CR
mechanism (133 of the 230 accounts). Figure 8 also shows
the malicious entities not identified by this part of the algo-
rithm which include the green asterisks (identified by pull-
networkedblogfb
Figure 9: An account, networkedblogfb, suspended
by Twitter whose initial set of friends had 56 users
that the CR value identified as malicious. The size
of each node is based on its CR value. Though
networkedblogfb has a much higher CR value, we
can identify it as malicious based on the company it
starts out with.
down), the pink dots (identified by excessive @-mentions
outside SN) and cyan pluses (not identified).
4.3 Identifying Collusions: Temporal Pulldown
Though the combined rank is successful in catching ag-
gressive malicious entities, there are other malicious entities
(green asterisks in Figure 8) who have significantly higher
PRTSN and they do not exhibit clearly bad behavior. A ma-
jority of these entities have attained high PRTSN values by
convincing legitimate users to interact with them, through
their inflated friend and follower counts. However, prob-
ing into the social network history of these accounts reveals
that a large number of their initial friends exhibit malicious
behavior in aggressive fashion. Our pulldown mechanism
exposes this and hence we are able to catch even those mali-
cious users who have significantly higher PRTSN or behav-
ior values. These users are more sophisticated as they have
better deception tactics which include better strategies at
successfully amassing friends and followers when they en-
tered the system. However, a large number of their friends
and followers fall in the bottom left of Figure 8. Thus, even
though these accounts may be in the far right or high above,
they will get pulled down due to the company they started
out with when they entered the system.
To further illustrate, we consider account networkedblogfb
who had 17000 friends and 15913 followers before it was sus-
pended. It posted tweets to sell tra"c and followers to users
which is against Twitter’s spam rules [8]. It interspersed
these tweets with a large number of famous inspirational
quotes giving the impression that it was a legitimate ac-
count with good information and a large follower and friend
base. However, our algorithm looks at the earliest set of
friends made by this account and we find that 56 of its initial
friends were all malicious (see Figure 9) that we previously
identified using the CR mechanism. Since such entities were
created for malicious activity, they do not have any real so-
cial network and therefore have to depend on a collusion to
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Figure 10: Number of malicious accounts in our
sample that the algorithm identified and were sub-
sequently suspended by Twitter over a period of 31
days. Also shown are all the entities in our sample
that were suspended by Twitter in the same time-
frame.
appear legitimate. The temporal pulldown uses this to its
advantage and allows us to identify even such sophisticated
malicious accounts.
4.4 Overall Effectiveness
We consider the corrected combined rank for all users
which is calculated as shown in Section 3.4 and identify all
users below a certain threshold as malicious. Since it is es-
timated that ! 12% of Twitter users are malicious [11], we
conservatively set the threshold such that 10% of users in
our system are identified as potentially malicious. We found
that the 10 seed malicious accounts that we considered are
in the bottom 10%. After running our algorithm, we also
observed the number of accounts that were suspended by
Twitter over the next 31 days. The number of these ac-
counts that were below our threshold value and the results
are shown in Figure 10. Since we finished our data collection
and ran our complete algorithm on March 8, and we started
checking for suspended accounts only on March 14, the first
data point contains all users suspended from 8th to 14th.
During this time 9 accounts were suspended and we already
identified 8 of them as potentially malicious. By April 14,
222 accounts were suspended out of which we identified 181.
Figure 10 also shows which part of the algorithm, the com-
bined rank, the corrected combined rank (Malicious List 1 in
Figure 7) or anomalous @-mentions (Malicious List 2 in Fig-
ure 7) identified the user. We see that the combined rank is
most e!ective in identifying malicious accounts, followed by
the temporal pulldown mechanism. This also follows from
the fact that the accounts caught by the pulldown mecha-
nism collude, are more deceptive and are fewer in number.
4.5 Users Identified as Potentially Malicious
Although 12% of Twitter accounts are estimated to be
malicious [11], Twitter has so far suspended a very small
fraction of them. In the bottom 10% of the users ranked by
our algorithm, there are 25, 272 accounts. We observed that
most of the 25, 272 users had links to a web page in their
tweets. Considering 20 links at random for each user, we
used Web Of Trust (WOT) [13] to classify the urls as good
or bad. For shortened urls we converted them to original urls
before querying WOT. WOT returns a four tuple containing
ratings for ‘Trustworthiness’, ‘Privacy’, ‘Vendor reliability’,
‘Child safety’, for each url. For each of the three features
other than ‘Child Safety’, we classified the web page as bad
if the rating for the feature was less than 40%. For each
web page with ‘Child safety’ rating less then 40%, we clas-
sified the webpage as potentially malicious. Of the 25, 272
users, 5178 had links to bad web pages and 156 had links to
potentially malicious web pages in their tweets.
We used content parsing on the tweets to categorize the
remaining 19, 938 users. Searching for a list of keywords
and combination of keywords which include ‘followers for
money’, ‘get followers’, ‘twitter train’..., we could categorize
5300 users as potentially malicious. Based on the infor-
mation in the ‘Bio’ field of the remaining 14, 638 users, we
classified 1157 users as online marketers. There is a fine
line that separates online marketers from malicious users.
We observed that many users who identified themselves as
online marketers had links to webpages that were poten-
tially malicious, but the web pages were not identified as
malicious by WOT. For the remaining 13, 481 users, more
detailed techniques are needed to classify them either as ma-
licious or as false positives.
4.6 False Positives
Since we cannot manually verify all of the bottom 10% of
users(! 25K), we consider the follow friday feature in twit-
ter, to identify the false positives among the bottom 10%
users classified as potentially malicious by the algorithm.
Any user can recommend another user to his followers using
‘follow friday’. As the follow friday feature of Twitter allows
any user to recommend other users, we observe that collud-
ing malicious entities recommend one another. To counter
this, we consider only recommendations by users not in the
bottom 10%. A user recommended by a certain number of
white listed users must also be good (with high probability)
and hence should not be blacklisted. We found that there
were only a small number of users (13) in the bottom 10%
who had at least one whitelisted user recommending them
through the Follow Friday mechanism.
4.7 Comparison With Other Systems
We compared our algorithm against two commercially avail-
able systems that grade Twitter users: Twitblocker built by
Hashrocket Labs that identifies spammers in Twitter and
Tweetgrade that was powered by Purewire research (now
Barracuda networks). For the 10 seed malicious accounts
that we considered, the comparison is shown in the Ap-
pendix. Our algorithm identifies all these users as poten-
tially malicious while a large majority of them are given high
grades by Twitblocker and Tweetgrade. For the first four
users who are spammers, Twitblocker and Tweetgrade gives
two of these users high A grades while user Coop5993230
is given an A grade by both these systems. Coop5993230
primarily tweets about Acai berry supplements known to be
a scam [1]. His other tweets also link to products. The next
three users either link to malware content or ask for Twitter
account details. Again two of them are given high grades by
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Twitter. In fact, LibertyBiz is currently suspended by Twit-
ter and it yet receives high grades from these systems. On
the other hand, we identify all these users to be potentially
malicious demonstrating the e!ectiveness of our algorithm.
4.8 Robustness of Algorithm
It is well known that malicious users adapt to defenses
that are put into a system. Thus, such users can change
their behavior by becoming less aggressive or they can try to
achieve a higher PRTSN . The changed behavior will reduce
their e!ectiveness which is not advantageous to them. On
the other hand, higher PRTSN cannot be easily attained
because high reputation users will not @-mention or retweet
poor quality information. Thus, we believe that the defenses
designed by the combined algorithm are di"cult to overcome
for malicious users.
5. RELATED WORK
The recent popularity of Twitter has attracted much re-
search. The social network of Twitter is unique as users fol-
low both friends and other information sources and celebri-
ties. Java et. al. [20] were the first to analyze the con-
nections in Twitter over a sample of users and found that
the in-degree and out-degree followed a power law distri-
bution similar to many social networks. Kwak et. al. [23]
conducted the same analysis over the entire Twittersphere
which include 41 million users and found that the power law
distribution only holds for users with less that 105 followers.
Though we only use a sample set of Twitter users, we show
a similar result, with our in degree and out degree distri-
bution exponents closely matching those calculated over the
entire Twittersphere [23], showing the representativeness of
our sample.
The existence of a hidden sparse network in Twitter which
reflects true user interactions is shown in [19]. They define
this hidden network by creating links only between users
who communicate with each other through directed mes-
sages such as @-mentions and RT. The conversation prac-
tices with respect to @-mentions and RT s in Twitter are
discussed in [18, 27]. Our paper uses both @-mentions and
RT s to compute the true social network of the user.
The fact that Twitter has characteristics of both a social
network and an information dissemination site is discussed
in [23, 20, 24]. Based on this Java et. al. [20] classify Twitter
users into three main categories based on the size of their
network: information source, friends and information seek-
ers. Naaman et. al. [24] also show that Twitter users can
be categorized into two main categories: me-formers (80%)
who post tweets relating to themselves and informers (20%)
who post tweets that are informational in nature. Krish
et. al. [22] provide another characterization of Twitter and
identify three main categories of Twitter users: broadcast-
ers, acquaintances, and miscreants-evangelists. This paper
recognizes the diversity in the intention of Twitters users
and uses a multi-dimensional approach to rank users.
A significant body of research has tried to identify users
who are most successful in disseminating information. Weng
et. al. [26] propose an algorithm based on PageRank [25]
and topical similarity to find topic wise influential users in
Twitter. A PageRank inspired algorithm to compute the
top influentials in Twitter is used in [9], and [23] compares
identifying influentials by follower count, by advertised SN
PageRank and by number of RT s. Our work, in contrast,
focuses on identifying malicious accounts. None of the ap-
proaches used above are good for this problem as (1) the ad-
vertised PageRank calculated purely on friend and follower
count can be easily manipulated by malicious entities, and
(2) PageRank alone is insu"cient in identifying malicious
entities.
In [27], Yardi et. al. look at trending topic spam for a sin-
gle topic in Twitter and identify spammers based on sugges-
tive keywords used, the presence of a URL and the presence
of numbers in spammer user names. Spammers can easily
evade these techniques and we have observed many spam-
mers in our sample who cannot be identified by any of these
mechanisms. They also hypothesize that spammers follow
other spammers (collusion) while legitimate users will follow
other users. While we agree that spammers do collude, we
see that many legitimate users including verified accounts
like BarackObama (733,267 friends) also automatically fol-
low a large number of users who follow them. To address
this we use a temporal mechanism to identify a collusion.
The problem of identifying malicious entities is not limited
to Twitter. Boykin et. al. [16] use social network analysis to
detect email spam. Gyöngyi et. al. [17] build on PageRank
to semi-automatically separate useful web-pages from spam.
An algorithm similar to PageRank for computing the repu-
tation of a node in a peer-peer network is described in [21].
This paper adapts PageRank to the true social network of
users in Twitter and uses it with the behavioral characteris-
tics and the collusion propensity of a user to identify if he is
legitimate or malicious. To the best of our knowledge, ours
is the first algorithm that automatically identifies a broad
class of malicious accounts in Twitter.
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper we were able to identify malicious Twit-
ter accounts based on the fact that they possess poor qual-
ity information and yet aggressively try to disseminate it.
In addition, for more sophisticated malicious users who use
collusion to appear legitimate, our temporal pulldown mech-
anism exposes their behavior. These two techniques help us
automatically identify close to 82% of accounts that were
eventually suspended by Twitter, demonstrating the e!ec-
tiveness of our algorithm. Our algorithm can also be used to
rank users across the entire Twittershpere and we will inves-
tigate ways of validating this in our future work. Though we
believe our sample set is representative, collecting a larger
user base will be useful in understanding the limitations of
our algorithm and potential techniques that more sophisti-
cated malicious users might use to evade detection. Finally,
our algorithm provides a set of users who have a high like-
lihood of being malicious. Determining automatic ways in
validating this would be extremely useful. Considering that
Twitter is catching spammers at a slow rate our algorithm
provides a good first step in identifying spammers.
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Coop5993230 1366 1222 Acai berry
scam
Active A+ A Caught
MarieGerry 2300 2100 Acai berry
scam
Blocked F none Caught
ifatloss4idiots 2000 1200 Mom’s teeth
scam
Active A+ C+ Caught
ebaydiscountz 858 297 Trending topic
spam
Active C A Caught
LibertyBiz 10110 10665 Misleading
tweets
Blocked A+ A- Caught
knighta10 4481 4957 Malware Links Active B F Caught
poojadwivedi 14 42 Twitter ac-
count hijacking
Active A+ A- Caught
girlbellaforum 317 213 Pornography Active C A- Caught
ajalil 134 127 unsolicited
@-mentions to
celebrities
Active A+ A+ Caught
hottweeters 1500 2700 unsolicited
@-mentions to
random users
Active A+ A+ Caught
Table 2: List of seed malicious entities. Our algorithm is e!ective in identifying all of them while other
Twitter user grading sites give them high grades.
12
